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I. INTRODUCTION: INSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES - STATE AND FEDERAL
Justice John Powers, in his manual for the training of Texas
ALJs, stated that the most significant concept one must master in
administrative law is that the rendering of a contested case order is an
"institutional decision."' Professor Richard Pierce, in commenting
upon the federal agency adjudicatory process, states:
The administrative process builds on the principle that
is used by a large medical clinic which often can
provide medical services superior to that any
individual physician can provide by bringing many
kinds of specialists into an organization that is planned
so as to provide a maximum of effectiveness to the
aptitudes of each individual. The institutional mind
has insights that are as profound as those of any
individual and may be much more comprehensive, for
the appropriate specialists collaborate by considering
the judgment of each other, each contributing his or
her own particular knowledge and skills.
2
The state and federal administrative systems reject the concept of
a lay decision-maker and replace a jury with the combined
intelligence and analysis of expertly trained personnel. Professor
Pierce notes that the critics of the administrative justice system have
long used the strict separation of powers concept as a paradigm for
criticism of the fairness of the administrative adjudications conducted
by the typical multi-function agency. He responds by finding that
this paradigm is the most costly and inefficient structure, which can
possibly be justified in our criminal justice system to reduce the risk
of erroneously incarcerating persons, but it does not necessarily
follow such a burden as is necessary in the civil administrative
system. Separation of functions can be implemented at the level of
1. JOHN E. POWERS, AGENCY ADJUDICATIONS, 84-87 (Tex. A&M Press 1990).
2. KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE, Vol. 1, § 8.6, 551-52 (Aspen Law & Business Co., 4th ed. 2002).
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individuals rather than at the agency level.
3
The federal APA takes great pains to insulate federal ALJs from
undue influence within the agency for which they work. Although
most Al~s work for, and within, particular administrative agencies,
they are not subject to the direct control of the agency policymakers.
Instead, they conduct hearings and execute their judicial duties
independent of the policymaking, investigative, and prosecutorial
functions of the office.4  Thus, the federal APA placed the
adjudicative process within the agency but removed the ALJs from
the agency's control. It has been noted that one of the great
achievements of the federal APA was this institutional independence
of the federal Al~s. 5 Yet, the federal AU does not gain decisional
independence unless delegated that power by the agency, for on
appeal from an initial decision of the federal AU, the APA provides
the agency secretary or board with all of the powers which it would
have had in making the initial decision. 6 This format allows for
initial impartial decision-making by a fact-finder but maintains the
concept that a final decision should be a result of the use of the
collective skills and expertise of the agency as a whole.
Arguably, this same policy approach influenced the structure of
state agencies which relegated the state AU to a fact-gatherer. The
contested case hearing process was merely considered a first step in
ultimately formulating an institutional decision issued by the
agency.7 In Texas, the Austin Court of Appeals has held that an AU
who is an employee of the agency has no power to bind an agency by
the mere issuance of a proposal for a decision. 8 By definition, a
3. Id. at Vol. 2, § 9.9, 679-71.
4. ROGERS, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 142-43 (Aspen Law Publications
2003).
5. James F. Flanagan, Redefining the Role of the State Administrative Law
Judge: Central Panels and Their Impact on State ALJ Authority and Standards of
Agency Review, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 1355, 1363-64 (Fall 2002).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1364-65.
8. Hunter Indus. Facilities, Inc. v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n,
910 S.W.2d 96, 102 (Tex. App.1995); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Bd. of Ins., 898
S.W.2d 930, 935 (Tex. App. 1995); Ross v. Tex. Catastrophe Prop. Ins., 770
S.W.2d 641, 642 (Tex. App. 1989).
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proposal for decision connotes a tentative and preliminary decision
which lacks finality and is merely a preliminary finding for
consideration and review by the agency. 9 Therefore, the agency is
free to reject such proposal for decision without any direct reference
to it and/or explanation of why the agency agreed or disagreed with
its findings.10  Logically, the agency members should give the
proposal for decision serious consideration because the AU saw and
heard the witnesses, as well as all of the arguments of counsel, and
has weighed and evaluated the evidence based on the applicable
burden of proof. However, the ultimate decision is made by the
agency as to the findings of fact and conclusions of law.1
Many states, like Texas, adopted the federal approach authorizing
agencies to exercise de novo review. After delegating power to an
ALJ to conduct the initial hearing, the agency board or commissioner
has virtually unrestricted powers to review and modify the AL's
findings. 12  However, as long ago as 1945, California began a
movement to create the establishment of central hearings panel
systems.13 The movement continues to gain strength 14 and more than
one-half of the states have adopted some form of a central hearing
panel. 15  Generally, a central hearings panel system creates an
independent corps of ALJs to preside over agency proceedings at the
request of administrative agencies.' 6 The basic purpose is to give the
ALJs a certain amount of independence from the agencies over
whose proceedings they preside.[
The main argument in favor of central hearings panels is the
9. Ross, 770 S.W.2d at 642; see also Sabine River Auth. of Tex. v. McNatt,
342 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tex. 1961).
10. Aetna, 898 S.W.2d at 935-36.
11. Ronald Beal, TEX. ADMIN. PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 8.3.2 (Lexis Law
Publishing 2004).
12. James F. Flanagan, supra note 5, at 1364-65.
13. Id. at 1357.
14. Allen C. Hoberg, Ten Years Later: The Progress of State Central Panels,
21 J.NAALJ 235, 244 (2001).
15. Christopher B. McNeil, The Model Act Creating a State Central Hearing
Agency. Promises, Practical Problems, and a Proposal for Change, 53 ADMIN. L.
REV. 475, 476-77 (2001).
16. Allen C. Hoberg, Administrative Hearings: State Central Panels in the
1990s, 46 ADMIN. L. REv. 75, 76 (1994).
17. Id.
concept of the appearance of fairness. The lay public is familiar with
the criminal process where the judge and the prosecutor are totally
independent. If an ALJ is an employee of the agency bringing an
enforcement action, the concern is that there will be at a minimum
the appearance of bias or actual undue influence since the AJ will
be imbued with the agency's culture and theoretically, his or her
career advancement may be impacted by a decision that the agency
members or senior staff dislike.' 8 As one senior ALJ has stated:
"The central panel structure, especially the free-standing central
panel, is the preferred structure from the standpoint of adjudicatory
professionalism, public confidence, and the judicial/decisional
independence of ALJs."19
The key issue that remains is whether to delegate to these
independent ALJs the power to finally determine contested case
proceedings, or whether there remains the need for institutionalized
decision-making. The key point: should the referring agency have
the power to modify and/or amend the findings and ultimate order of
the AL? Up until the early 1990s, most states permitted the
referring agency to amend the AL's findings of fact and conclusions
of law, but there has been a recent movement to place final decision-
making authority in the ALJ.2  To some, this demise of
institutionalized decision-making has not been justified on its own
merits .21
This article will explore the Texas approach of creating a central
hearings panel and how Texas has struggled with the degree of
independence it should vest in the ALJ decision-maker. The Texas
system was originally described as taking a "minimal approach," but
today it is seen as a comprehensive system which decides the
overwhelming majority of contested case orders within the state of
Texas. 22 The central hearings panel approach has been adopted in
some form in at least half the states and it is anticipated that there
will be a real surge in the establishment of central hearings panels in
18. McNeil, supra note 15, at 484.
19. Judge Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Special Problems of State Administrative Law
Judges, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 403, 405 (2001).
20. Flanagan, supra note 5, at 1373-82.
21. Id. at 1362.
22. Hoberg, supra note 14, at 242-44.
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the remainder of the states in the near future. 23 Since the central
hearings panel's approach potentially threatens the continuing
viability of the concept of institutional decision-making, it is
appropriate to analyze that potential impact in a state, such as Texas,
that has a comprehensive central hearings panel system.
I. THE JUSTIFICATION OR NEED FOR A CENTRAL HEARINGS PANEL IN
TEXAS
The Texas House of Representatives commissioned a study of the
possible advantages and disadvantages of creating a central hearings
panel of administrative law judges in 1986.24 The report stated that
the fundamental problem with the existing hearing officer's system
that utilized employees of the agency with jurisdiction over the
contested case proceeding was the appearance of unfairness. It
alluded to the potential procedural due process problems, but it
focused and relied upon the generally accepted perception that a
hearing officer's main function is to protect those who deal with state
agencies from arbitrary or unwise action, by providing the agency
and the judiciary with an impartial assessment of the merits of the
issues of the contested case proceeding. 26 The report focused on the
fact-finding function of the hearing officer and clearly noted that the
agency would continue to have the duty and power to dictate which
relevant statutes or rules were applicable, as well as the meaning of
those standards as the board had previously or presently construed
them. The report concluded that an independent hearing officer
system would introduce and guarantee minimum standards of due
process to the contested case hearing, but limiting agency heads to
reviewing proposals for decisions "for reasons of policy" would still
allow the agency members to remain "quite free" to implement
27policy and overrule specific decisions.
23. Id. at 244.
24. Report on the Advantages and Disadvantages to the State of Creating a
Central Panel of Administrative Law Judges Before the Committee on the
Judiciary, H.R., 69th Leg. Sess. (Tx. 1986) [hereinafter House Report].
25. Id. at 98.
26. Id. at 81-83.
27. Id. at 100.
The tenor of the House Report, read as a whole, indicated a clear
concern for providing an impartial decision-maker to determine the
basic findings of fact as to who did or did not do something, where it
happened, when it happened, how it happened, and all other factual
disputes regarding a particular licensee, applicant, or regulated party.
However, the report did not assert any need to totally remove
decision-making power from the agency, nor restrict it to a mere
"appellate" type of review allowing reversal by the agency only upon
a finding of reversible error. It is undisputed that the report proposed
that the agency remain the ultimate decision-maker with the specific
power to define the meaning of the relevant statutes and rules
applicable to the case, as well as the power to substitute judgment as
to the application or implementation of those standards to the basic
findings of underlying facts as set forth by the independent hearing's
examiner.
28
The Texas Legislature struggled from the beginning with whether
to preserve the concept of institutional decision-making within the
creation of a central hearings panel. It found compelling that the
citizens of the State of Texas viewed the existing administrative
system as basically unfair when the decision-maker was an employee
of the agency where the dispute arose. The Legislature was
concerned that the present system in Texas potentially violated due
process. The report saw the need to not only create a central hearings
panel, but to accord certain independence to the ALJs to determine
the basic, or underlying, facts in a dispute. In other words, the report
presumed that disputes between an agency and a citizen did not go to
trial or hearing unless there was a fundamental disagreement as to
who did what, where, when, how, and possibly why. The concern
was that citizens did not believe they got a "fair shake" if the accuser
(i.e., the agency) ultimately determined what did or did not occur.
Thus, there was a need for an independent decision-maker to
determine those underlying facts. However, the report did not see a
threat to the appearance of fairness to allow the agency to continue to
have the final determination as to the meaning of the law and its
application to those underlying facts.29
It has been established in section I that the federal administrative
28. Id.
29. Id. at 83-100.
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system takes the approach that administrative law judges may be
afforded a degree of institutional independence, even while being
physically and legally a part of a particular regulatory agency. As
Professor Pierce noted, separation of functions can be implemented at
the level of the individuals rather than at the agency level.
30
However, the Texas study concluded that the average lay citizen
could not believe they had been accorded a fair hearing when the
administrative law judge was physically and legally a part of the
regulatory agency. Therefore, the report strongly recommended that
to preserve the integrity of the administrative system, it was
necessary to physically and legally separate the administrative law
judge from the regulatory agency. Yet it still found it critical to the
overall workings of administrative agencies that the ultimate decision
in a case be determined by the regulatory agency.
11. THE CREATION OF SOAH: THE TEXAS STATE OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS - AN INDEPENDENT AGENCY TO
CONDUCT CONTESTED CASE HEARINGS
In 1991, the Texas Legislature created a state agency named the
State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH).31 It was comprised
of "independent" hearing officers to be utilized by all state agencies
that did not employ at least one individual whose only duty was to
preside as a hearing officer over matters related to contested case,
hearings before the agency, or any agency otherwise required by law,
32or arranged by contract, to refer contested cases to SOAH.3 SOAH
started with only six ALJs and three support staff in August of 1992,
but has now grown substantially to over sixty ALJs and sixty support
staff members with its jurisdiction greatly enhanced. Over the last
twelve years, the Texas Legislature has enlarged the jurisdiction of
SOAH by transferring, by statute, the contested case proceedings of
many major regulatory agencies. Specifically, the Texas Legislature
transferred the contested cases of the Public Utility Commission and
30. See supra, notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
31. H.R. 591, § 1, 72nd Leg. Sess. (Tx. 1991).
32. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 2003.021(b)(1)-(2), 2003.021(b)(4) (Vernon
2004).
the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality to SOAH.33
SOAH's jurisdiction was clearly established in 1993 by an attorney
general opinion that held an agency could not forego the services of
an SOAH AU by a quorum of the members sitting as the presiding
officer at a contested case hearing. 34 The Attorney General held that
the legislative intent was to create an administrative judiciary
independent of the agency who could objectively hear administrative
disputes. 35 The opinion is bolstered by the fact that the statutory
language states that SOAH "shall conduct all administrative hearings
in contested cases" of an agency subject to its jurisdiction. 36
Therefore, in the State of Texas today, SOAH hears and determines
the overwhelming majority of contested case hearings of
administrative agencies.
3
33. §§ 2003.47-2003.48.
34. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. DM-231 (1993).
35. Id. at 1-3.
36. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2003.021(b) (Vernon 2004) (emphasis added).
37. SOAH's current jurisdiction, mandatory and voluntary, is as follows: (A)
Mandatory: Appraisers Licensing and Certification Board (Texas Real Estate
Commission), Board of Acupuncture Examiners, Board of Medical Examiners,
Board of Nurse Examiners, Board of Physician Assisted Examiners, Board
Examiners of Psychologists, Board of Tax Professional Examiners, Board of
Registration of Professional Engineers, Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners,
Board of Vocational Nurse Examiners, Commission on Human Services,
Commission on Law Enforcement Officer Standards and Education, Commission
on Private Security, Credit Union Department, Department of Mental Health and
Mental Retardation, Department of Protective and Regulatory Services,
Department of Public Safety, Employees Retirement System, Executive Council of
Physical Therapy and Occupational Therapy Examiners, Firefighter's Pension
Commission, Funeral Service Commission, Health and Human Services
Commission, Human Rights Commission, Optometry Board, Public Utility
Commission of Texas, Real Estate Commission, Secretary of State, State Board of
Plumbing Examiners, State Securities Board, State Soil and Water Conservation
Board, Teacher Retirement System, Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission, Texas
Animal Health Commission, Texas Board of Land Surveying, Texas Commission
on Alcohol an d Drug Abuse, Texas Commission for the Blind, Texas Commission
on Fire Protection, Texas Cosmetology Commission, Texas Department on Aging,
Texas Department of Agriculture, Texas Department of Health, Texas Department
of Housing and Community Affairs, Texas Department of Insurance, Texas
Department of Transportation, Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, Texas
Lottery Commission, Texas Environmental Quality Commission, Texas Parks and
Wildlife Department, Texas Racing Commission, Texas State Board of
Spring 2005 The Texas State Office of Admidnistrative Hearings
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An SOAH AU is directly accountable to the chief administrative
law judge. 38 SOAH is divided into seven teams. A natural resources
team holds contested case proceedings for the Texas Commission on
Environmental Quality (TCEQ). 39 A utilities team hears contested
cases on behalf of the Public Utility Commission (PUC). 40 Finally,
what was formally called the Central Hearings Panel is now divided
into five teams: (1) the Economic Team, (2) the Licensing and
Enforcement Team, (3) the Medical Team, (4) the Administrative
License Revocation & Field Enforcement Team, and (5) the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Team.41 The chief AU may also
appoint senior or master ALJs to perform duties on his or her
behalf.42  SOAH has adopted rules that establish the application
procedure to be followed by an agency when requesting an AU.
43
SOAH selects the AU to preside at the hearing. Rules have been
adopted providing for an AU to excuse or disqualify himself or
herself in a particular case as well as to provide for a substitute AU
in the event of a conflict.44 The ALJ conducting the proceeding acts
independently of the agency and the agency is expressly prohibited
from attempting to influence the findings of fact or the application of
law by the AU except by the formal presentation of evidence and
Architectural Examiners, Texas State Board of Barber Examiners, Texas State
Board of Chiropractic Examiners, Texas State Board of Dental Examiners, Texas
State Board of Pharmacy, Texas State Board of Podiatric Medical Examiners,
Texas State Board of Public Accountancy, Texas Structural Pest Control Board,
Texas Water Development Board, Texas Workers' Compensation Commission,
and Texas Work Force Commission; (B) Voluntary Contracts: Attorney General's
Office, Department of Information Resources, Edwards Aquifer Authority,
Evergreen Underground Water Conservation Commission, General Land Office,
Interagency Council on Early Childhood Intervention, Texas Southern University,
State Board for Educators Certification, Texas County and District Retirement
System, Texas Ethics Commission, Texas Municipal Retirement System, Texas
Youth Commission, and Uvalde County Underground Water Conservation District;
(C) Contract Claims on Individual Basis: Texas A & M University, Texas Tech
University, and The University of Houston.
38. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2003.022(a) (Vernon 2004).
39. § 2003.047.
40. § 2003.049.
41. § 2003.046(a)-(b).
42. § 2003.0411.
43. 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 155.9(a)(2), 155.9(c) (West 2005).
44. § 155.17(a)-(e).
legal argument.45 However, prior to the hearing, the agency is
required to provide the AU with a written statement of applicable
rules or policies. 46 The independence of SOAH judges is ensured by
the statutory requirements that all training, evaluation, discipline and
promotion is vested in the administrative division of SOAH and not
the agencies that actually utilize the services of the ALJ.47
In 1999, the Legislature amended the statute governing SOAH,48
adding provisions to bolster the independence of the agency. 49 The
new provisions expressly state that SOAH was created to serve as an
independent forum for the conduct of contested cases, and that the
purpose of SOAH was to separate the adjudicative function from the
investigative, prosecutorial, and policy-making functions exercised
by regulatory agencies. 50 It specifically provided that an AJ was
neither responsible to nor subject to the supervision, direction, or
indirect influence of, any person other than the chief administrative
law judge. In particular, the ALJ was not responsible to or subject to
the supervision, direction, or indirect influence of an officer,
employee, or agent of another state agency who performed
investigative, prosecutorial, or advisory functions for the other
agency.
51
The Legislature has statutorily achieved the goal of wholly
separating the hearing process from the regulatory agency that has
commenced the contested case proceeding. The ALJ is truly
independent, not subject to the direct or indirect influence of the
referring agency, and is solely responsible to the chief administrative
law judge. Therefore, not only is there the appearance of
impartiality, there is impartiality in fact. It is this author's opinion
that the chief administrative law judge, all the SOAH AUs and the
practicing bar would agree that from the inception of the agency,
SOAH has maintained an independent status and the culture of the
agency is without doubt that the ALJs are independent quasi-judicial
45. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.058(d); § 2003.051 (Vernon 2004).
46. § 2001.058(c).
47. § 2003.045.
48. 1999 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 85 (Vernon).
49. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. tit. 10, ch. 2003 (Vernon 2004).
50. § 2003.021(a).
51. § 2003.041(c).
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officers who are employed to conduct fair hearings without regard to
which particular agency has commenced the contested case
proceeding.
A. The Powers of an SOAH ALI
In a contested case proceeding to be administered by an SOAH
AU, the case shall be commenced by the agency itself, or the
appropriate pleadings or forms shall be filed by a person at the
agency that has appropriate jurisdiction over the subject matter. 52
The SOAH AU acquires jurisdiction over the contested case matter
when the agency files a Request to Docket Case form with SOAH. 53
The AU must conform his or her conduct to the applicable
provisions of the Texas Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The
AU is required to follow SOAH's procedural rules unless those rules
incorporate by reference the procedural rules of the state agency for
which the hearing is conducted.
54
The AU has the power to oversee discovery prior to the hearing,
including the power to issue an order setting forth a discovery control
plan.55 As to the issuance of subpoenas and commissions related to
discovery, a party must apply directly to the agency with jurisdiction
for their issuance. 56 However, SOAH has adopted rules allowing for
a party to file objections or seek a protective order from the AU. 57
Prior to September 1, 1997, AU discovery orders were subject to
review by the referring agency, however, the review provision has
been eliminated by the Legislature.
58
The AU is vested with discretion to determine if one or more
pre-hearing conferences shall be held. 59 The subject matter of such
conferences may be restricted solely to discovery matters and pre-
hearing motions, or it may also include settlement discussions, the
order of presentation of the evidence at the hearing, a determination
52. 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 155.7(a), 155.9(a)-(f) (West 2004).
53. § 155.7(b)-(c).
54. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2003.050(a)-(b) (Vernon 2004).
55. 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 155.3 1(g) (West 2004).
56. § 155.31(e).
57. § 155.3 1(e), (i), (j), (1), (m).
58. 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 934 (Vernon).
59. 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 155.33(a) (West 2004).
of the controlling and disputed factual and legal issues, and such
other matters that will promote the orderly and prompt conduct of the
hearing. The ALJ may order the consolidation of dockets or joint
hearings on dockets if there are common issues of law or fact and
consolidation or if a joint hearing will aid in the fair and efficient
handling of the contested matters. The AL may also order severance
of issues if separate hearings on such issues will aid the fair and
efficient handling of a contested matter.60  The ALU may also
mandate that the parties prepare a pre-hearing statement of the case.
61
Settlement conferences solely for the purpose of exploring the
settlement of a case may be held at the discretion of the AU or at the
request of a party.62 The ALT may order referral of a contested case
to a mediated settlement conference or other appropriate alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) procedure. 63 However, a party may object
to the ADR process and a request that the ADR referral be reviewed
by the ADR Team Leader.
64
SOAH has adopted rules providing the specific requirements for
all motions a party may desire to file regarding the pending case.
Specific forms and deadlines are set forth in the rules that must be
complied with by all parties. 65 The motions that may be considered
by the ALJ are: (1) discovery motions, (2) motions to intervene, (3)
continuances, and (4) motions for summary disposition, including
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, mootness, failure to prosecute, and
unnecessary duplication of proceedings.
66
The agency has the ultimate responsibility to provide notice to all
parties of the pending case proceeding, but the ALJ has the power to
provide notice of the specific time, date and place for the hearing.
67
The ALJ has the full authority and duty to impose all reasonable
requirements upon the parties in order to maintain order, avoid
60. § 155.33(c).
61. §§ 155.15(b)(4)-(5), 155.33(a).
62. § 155.37.
63. § 155.33(d).
64. § 155.37.
65. § 155.29(b)-(g), (i).
66. §§ 155.29(e)-(f), 155.31(g), (i)-(m), 155.56, 155.57.
67. § 155.27(a)-(b).
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unnecessary delay, and to conduct a full, fair, and impartial hearing.
68
The AU regulates the course of the proceeding and has the power to:
(1) administer oaths; (2) take testimony, including the power to
question witnesses; (3) rule on questions of evidence; (4) rule on
discovery issues; (5) issue orders relating to pre-hearing and hearing
matters, including orders imposing sanctions; (6) admit or deny
party status; (7) limit irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious
testimony and reasonably limit the time for evidentiary presentations;
(8) rule on motions of parties (or the AU's own motions), including
granting or denying a continuance; (9) request parties to submit legal
memoranda and propose findings of fact and conclusions of law; and
(10) issue proposals for decision and where authorized, final
decisions.
For contested cases referred by an agency, the AU may impose
appropriate sanctions against a party or its representative for: (A)
filing a motion or pleading that is groundless and brought in bad faith
for purposes of harassment, or for any other improper purpose, such
as to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of the
proceeding; (B) abuse of the discovery process in seeking, making or
resisting discovery; or (C) failure to obey an applicable rule or an
order of the AU or of the state agency on behalf of which the hearing
is being conducted. In addition, where appropriate and justified by a
party or representative's behavior described above, and after notice
and opportunity for hearing, an AU may issue an order: (A)
disallowing further discovery of any kind or of a particular kind by
the offending party; (B) charging all or any party of the expense of
discovery against the offending party or its representatives; (C)
holding that designated facts be considered admitted for purposes of
the proceeding; (D) refusing to allow the offending party to support
or oppose a designated claim or defense or prohibiting the party from
introducing designated matters in evidence; (E) disallowing in whole
or in part requests for relief by the offending party and excluding
evidence in support of those requests; and (F) striking pleadings or
testimony or both, in whole or in part. 69
At the conclusion of the testimony, it is within the discretion of
68. §§ 155.15(a)-(b), 155.31(m), 155.41(a).
69. § 155.15(b)(1)-(12). See also TEX. GOv'T CODE ANN, §§ 2003.047,
2003.048 (Vernon 2004).
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the AU to request that the parties submit legal memoranda on
disputed issues and to prepare and submit proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law.70 After analyzing the evidence and legal
arguments of the parties, the AL shall issue a proposal for decision
that includes findings of facts and conclusions of law.71 The parties
may submit any exceptions, objections, or other response to the
proposal for decision to the agency that possesses final decision-
making authority in the case (the referring agency). Any replies to
the exceptions, objections, or other responses may also be filed with
the referring agency. Copies of all the aforementioned documents
must be served on SOAH and directed to the AL who rendered the
decision. The ALJ shall review the documents filed and notify the
referring agency that the documents have been reviewed and set forth
any changes to the proposal for decision that the AL recommends,
including any correction of clerical errors.
72
Thus, the SOAH AL is invested with all necessary powers to
conduct a fair and impartial hearing. At the close of the evidence, the
ALJ has the power to set forth findings of fact. The AU must base
his or her findings exclusively on the evidence submitted into the
hearing record and that which has been officially noticed.73 A
finding of fact may be inferred only upon a determination that the
evidence preponderates in favor of its existence. 74 Such findings, if
set forth in statutory language, must be accompanied by a concise
and explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting them.75 If
the AL allows the parties to submit proposed findings, the order
76
shall include a ruling on each. The proposal for decision must
recommend a result and contain a statement of the reasons for the
proposed decision, including each finding of fact and conclusion of
law necessary to the proposed decision. It is not to be a neutral,
70. 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 155.15(b)(9) (West 2004).
71. §§ 155.15(b)(10), 155.59(a).
72. § 155.59(c)-(d).
73. TEX. GOv'T CODE ANN. § 2001.141(c) (Vernon 2004).
74. S.W. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 962 S.W.2d 207, 213 (Tex.
App. 1998); Prof 1 Mobile Home Transp. v. R.R. Comm'n, 733 S.W.2d 892, 899
(Tex. App. 1987); Beaver Express Serv., Inc. v. R.R. Comm'n, 727 S.W.2d 768,
775 n.3 (Tex. App. 1987).
75. TEX. GOv'T CODE ANN. § 2001.141 (d) (Vernon 2004).
76. § 2001.141(e).
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detailed reflection of the record, but rather a summary of the
presented evidence and the AL's recommendation regarding the just
result of the dispute.
77
As to issues of law, the APA provides that a state agency may not
attempt to influence the AL's application of the law in a contested
case except by proper legal argument. 78 However, the APA also
provides that a state agency must provide the AU with a written
statement of applicable rules or policies.79
Read together, these statutory provisions imply that the AU has
the power to initially determine what law is applicable to the
proceeding, the meaning of the law, and how it should be applied to
the facts of the particular case. Even though the agency may advise
the AU of the applicable law, there is no indication within these
statutes that such advice is binding. This lack of binding effect is
clearly implied by the fact that the agency is prohibited from
attempting to influence the AU except by proper legal argument. If
the agency's directive as to what law applied was binding, there
would be no need for legal argument. Thus, the AU may initially
and independently determine the applicability and meaning of the
relevant statutes and rules. 8°  Thus, the AU clearly acts as an
impartial, independent decision-maker as to all issues of fact and law.
This independence is insured by the fact that the APA prohibits
ex parte communications between a member or employee of a state
agency who is assigned to render a decision or to make findings of
facts and conclusions of law in a contested case and any person,
party, state agency or representative of those entities. 8  This
prohibition has been recognized to be a codification of the
constitutional procedural due process guarantee that a person may not
be subjected to an agency order that relies on evidence not
introduced, or made part of, the record. 82 The primary purpose of the
77. Graff Chevrolet Co. v. Tex. Motor Vehicle Bd., 60 S.W.3d 154, 159-60
(Tex. App. 2001).
78. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.058(d) (Vernon 2004).
79. § 2001.058(c).
80. Ronald Beal, Issuing a Proposal for Decision: An Analysis of the Power
of an Administrative Law Judge in Rendering Proposed Findings in a Contested
Case Proceeding, 2 TEX. TECH J. TEX. ADMIN. L. 209 (Summer 2001).
81. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.061 (a) (Vernon 2004).
82. Smith v. Houston Chem. Servs., Inc., 872 S.W.2d 252, 278 (Tex. App.
provision is to preclude "litigious facts" from coming before the
decision-maker without becoming a part of the record in the
contested case. 83 A related matter is when the ex parte contact is not
to supply evidence that is material to the forthcoming contested case
proceeding, but to improperly influence the decision-maker based on
non-evidentiary grounds. There is a presumption of the honesty and
integrity of agency officials, however, that presumption is rebuttable.
The burden is a heavy one, for a party must demonstrate the contact
rendered the decision-maker's mind to be irrevocably closed on the
matter in issue or that the official's actions were corrupt in its
inception.84 The judiciary has held that the overall theme of the APA
is to separate decision-makers in an adversary hearing from
extraneous influences that will discredit the administrative process
and undermine the public confidence in government. 85  The
administrative law judge should consider the position as one
analogous to a judge in the constitutional court system. Their duty is
to be charged with the solemn trust to act fairly and impartially in
fulfilling their vested duties. Each act performed must be done with
genuine even-handedness, compelled by a firm desire to provide to
everyone their due. The overriding goal should be to shun any action
or conduct that would tend to undermine the faith and confidence of
the parties and the public. 86 Therefore, the chief protection against
the scourge of ex parte communications will always be the morality
and good judgment of the decision-makers. 87
There are two exceptions, or defenses, to the allegation that a
prohibited ex parte communication has occurred. First, a member or
employee of an agency may communicate ex parte with an agency
1994); Coalition Advocating a Safe Env't v. Tex. Water Comm'n, 798 S.W.2d 639,
642 (Tex. App.) vacated as moot, 819 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. 1991).
83. Hammack v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 131 S.W.3d 713 (Tex. App. 2004);
Basse Truck Line, Inc. v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, 2003 Tex. App.
Lexis 8249 (2003).
84. Tex. State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry v. Carp, 388 S.W.2d 409, 414-
16 (Tex. 1965).
85. County of Galveston v. Tex. Dep't of Health, 724 S.W.2d 115, 123 (Tex.
App. 1987).
86. Lewis v. Guar. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 483 S.W.2d 837, 843 (Tex. App.
1972).
87. Galveston, 724 S.W.2d at 123 n.5.
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employee who has not participated in the hearing for purposes of
using the special skills or knowledge of the agency and its staff in
evaluating the evidence. 88 One interpretation of this exception is that
it is only applicable after the close of the hearing, when the hearing
officer is evaluating the evidence. It could be argued, however, that a
hearing officer may need such technical advice immediately before
or during the hearing if a particular issue of material fact is so
complex or confusing that the officer cannot reasonably follow the
evidence or argument of counsel on a particular issue. This would be
particularly necessary if the hearing officer was faced with a motion
similar to a motion for summary judgment prior to the hearing or a
directed or instructed verdict during the pendency of the case. The
better view would be to construe the exception as allowing such ex
parte communications to aid the hearing officer in making an
informed decision on the facts. The hearing officer would be well
advised to give notice of the contents of the communication and an
opportunity to all parties to rebut the advice, but such procedures are
not required.
89
The APA is ambiguous as to whether such technical advice is
required to be placed in the contested case record. The APA
expressly requires that all staff memoranda or data submitted to or
considered by the AU be placed in the record.9° This implies that
oral communications need not be included. However, to avoid any
constitutional procedural due process concerns, an ALJ should
require that the staff member reduce his or her comments to writing
and have it placed in the record.
This exception is not applicable to an SOAH AL. An agency is
prohibited from communicating with an AU to influence findings of
fact "except by proper evidence." 91 The meaning of this phrase must
undoubtedly restrict all agency member or employee
communications to the formal presentation of evidence during the
contested case hearing. Reading these provisions as a whole, thus
allowing an SOAH AL to utilize this ex parte communication
exception, would frustrate the overriding goal of creating an
88. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.061(c) (Vernon 2004).
89. Galveston, 724 S.W.2d at 122.
90. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.060(7) (Vernon 2004).
91. § 2001.058(d).
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independent hearing officer agency.
The second exception relates to communications regarding issues
of law. Since the express exception analyzed above solely applies to
communications with staff related to questions of fact, it could be
argued that this clearly implies the Legislature did not intend an
exception for issues of law. The Austin Court of Appeals has
rejected this construction for a number of reasons: (1) legal problems,
powers, procedures and methods pervade and dominate the
administrative process generally, and in contested cases particularly;
and (2) agency members or commissioners need not be legally
trained. This implies the Legislature intended that they should have
the independent advice of a legally trained person who did not
participate in the proceeding when necessary to discharge the
responsibilities under the regulatory scheme. 92 The court did not
solely rely on necessary implication, but held the exception fell into
the general exception set forth at the beginning of the ex parte section
in the APA that provided "[u]nless required for the disposition of an
ex parte matter authorized by law." 93 Finally, the court believed that
without the necessary legal advice, contested case proceedings would
be a charade that would result in absurd consequences to the
detriment of public and private interests .94
This exception would clearly not apply to SOAH ALJs. The
APA expressly provides that an agency shall supply the AU with a
written statement of applicable rules or policies, 95 but it expressly
prohibits any attempt to influence the AI's application of the law.
96
This specific prohibition would clearly supersede the general
exception to ex parte communications since it is specifically tailored
to the overall goal of insulating SOAH ALJs from agency influence
to ensure the order is rendered by an impartial tribunal.
A realistic twist on the ex parte communication prohibition is the
issue of whether an SOAH AU may communicate ex parte on issues
of fact or law with another member of SOAH. The ex parte
provision allows communications with "agency employees" of a state
92. Galveston, 724 S.W.2d at 123-24.
93. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.061(a) (Vernon 2004).
94. Galveston, 724 S.W.2d at 124.
95. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.058(c) (Vernon 2004).
96. § 2001.058(d).
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agency.97 SOAH statutory language expressly provides that it is a
"state agency." 98 If an SOAH AU needs some impartial advice as to
a question of law or fact, the plain language of the statute appears to
allow such communications.
Therefore, the current statutory framework and legal
interpretation thereof guarantees that SOAH is an independent central
hearings panel. It fulfills the appearance of propriety and impartiality
in the decision-making process. It guarantees significant
involvement by the referring agency as to all issues of law and fact,
but vests the ultimate decision-making power in the AU in issuing
an order at the end of the proceeding. However, as set forth above,
the Texas Legislature did not choose to give complete, final decision-
making authority to SOAH ALJs in the regulatory sphere. Unless the
statute provides otherwise, the SOAH ALJ merely issues a proposal
for decision, with the final decision being issued by the referring
agency. It will be established below, however, that the proposal for
decision issued by the SOAH ALJ has dramatic impact upon the
ultimate order issued by the referring agency.
IV. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THE SOAH PFD AND THE AGENCY
FINAL ORDER - Two APPROACHES TO MAINTAINING INSTITUTIONAL
DECISION-MAKING
The APA provides that the agency board may issue a final order
in a contested case proceeding that must be based solely on the
evidence or those matters officially noticed within the record. 99
There is no requirement that the agency members have heard the
evidence and, in certain situations, the decision or order may be
rendered without a majority of the members reading the entirety of
the record. 1°° The APA provides that a decision or order of an
agency board that is adverse to a party in a contested case proceeding
must be in writing or stated in the record,10' and it must include
97. § 2001.061(c).
98. § 2003.021(a).
99. § 2001.141(b)-(c).
100. § 2001.062.
101. § 2001.141(a).
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findings of fact and conclusions of law separately stated. 10 2 The
APA does not set forth the exact format of the order, but if the
findings of fact are set forth in statutory language, those findings
must be accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the
underlying facts that support them.'0 3 Finally, the APA provides that
if an agency has adopted a rule granting a right to the parties to
submit proposed findings of fact, the decision shall include a ruling
on each proposed finding.
0 4
It has been established that prior to the creation of SOAH, and for
any current ALJ that is an employee of the agency conducting the
contested case hearing, the ALJ has no power to bind an agency by
the mere issuance of a proposal for decision.'0 5 The agency is free to
reject the ALJ's proposal for decision even without direct reference
to it or an explanation of why the agency disagreed with its findings.
Thus, the ALJ proposal for decision is merely an informed
suggestion or proposal for the agency to consider. 06 If the status quo
remained after the creation of SOAH, the only "change" in the Texas
administrative system would have been that the "fact gatherer" would
"independently create a record for decision" for the agency officials
vested with issuing the final order. Therefore, even though the initial
decision-maker was insulated from undue agency influence as to the
meaning of the applicable law, the determination of the basic or
underlying facts and the ultimate determination of the holding in the
case by the application of law to the facts, the agency could wholly
disregard with impunity those carefully crafted findings. It would be
fair to say that the Texas citizen was provided an "appearance of
independent decision-making," but the critical findings of the order
could be rendered without any deference to the one who heard the
evidence and viewed the witnesses subject to direct and cross
examination.
The Texas Legislature, however, fundamentally changed the
status quo by making the SOAH AL proposal for decision as the
focal point of the agency's analysis in formulating its final order.
102. § 2001.141(b).
103. § 2001.141(d).
104. § 2001.141(e).
105. See supra, notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
106. Hunter, 910 S.W.2d at 102; Aetna, 898 S.W.2d at 935-36.
Spring 2005
140 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 25-1
The manner in which this was accomplished was by universally
requiring an agency to justify its change or modification of the
findings set forth within the SOAH AL's proposal for decision.
A. Modification of the SOAH ALJ PFD: Justify It
The APA was modified at the time that SOAH was created to
provide that if an agency board modifies an SOAH AL's proposal
for decision, the agency must set forth in writing the reason and legal
basis for the change in its final order.' °7 In a series of decisions,
agency orders have been reversed and remanded by the judiciary
solely because the agencies involved did not comply with this
procedural requirement. 10 8  These decisions emphasized that the
written explanation must state the reason and legal basis for the
change made. The court defined "legal basis" as the source from
which the policy is derived; the term "reasoned" requires the agency
to articulate a rational connection between the stated policy and the
change ordered by the agency. 10 9  An ambiguous, logically
inconsistent or cursory statement will not suffice, 10 nor will a
generically stated boilerplate statement that globally justifies in
conclusory terms multiple, specific changes made by the board
reviewing the AU's proposal for decision."'
It can be argued that this "pen to paper" requirement would alone
have preserved the concept of "institutional decision-making" but
would also have achieved the new legislative goal of the agency
process having the appearance of fairness and a lack of impropriety.
When an agency must articulate a rational justification within an
order as to why it changed either the findings of fact or conclusions
of law of an AU which is subject to review by the constitutional
judiciary based on the record evidence developed before the AU, a
party is clearly entitled to a meaningful hearing. Not only must an
107. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.058(e)(3) (Vernon 2004).
108. Flores v. Employee's Ref. Sys. of Tex., 74 S.W.3d 532, 540 (Tex. App.
2002); Levy v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 966 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. App. 1998);
Employee's Ref. Sys. of Tex. v. McKillip, 956 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. App. 1997).
109. Levy, 966 S.W.2d at 815-16; McKillip, 956 S.W.2d at 800-01.
110. McKillip, 956 S.W.2d at 801-02.
111. Levy, 966 S.W.2d at 816.
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agency board justify the rationality of its finding based on the
record's evidence, it must also rationally justify why the AlJ's
analysis of that evidence or law was misguided. An impartial
constitutional judiciary may then review the rationality of that
analysis in light of the record before them and the specific findings
and justifications of the ALJ as set forth within the PFD. The Texas
Legislature chose to impose this pen to paper requirement in two
different contexts: (1) where the agency may modify all findings of
facts and conclusions of law of the SOAH AU; and (2) where the
agency may only modify mixed application of law to fact finding and
conclusions of law of the SOAH AJ. Each statutory scenario will
now be analyzed to determine the impact of requiring that an agency
rationally respond to the proposed findings of the SOAH ALJ.
B. Approach One: All Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
are Subject 2o Agency Modification
The Legislature has chosen to allow certain agencies complete
authority to modify the SOAH AL's proposal for decision. SOAH
ALJs who conduct contested case hearings for the Public Utility
Commission (PUC) work within the Utility Division of SOAH." 2
The PUC may change any finding of fact or conclusion of law made
by the SOAH ALJ."' Likewise, a special Natural Resource Division
has been created within SOAH to conduct contested case hearings for
the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ).' 14  The
TCEQ has all power to amend the proposal for decision including
any findings of fact. 115 Finally, even though a special division was
not created for the Texas Employees Retirement System (ERS), any
proposal for decision issued by SOAH within the jurisdiction of the
ERS is subject to modification as to all findings of facts and
conclusions of law. 1 6 However, all three agencies are required to
comply with the APA requirement set forth above that every change
in the proposal for decision must be justified in writing within the
112. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2003.049(a) (Vernon 2004).
113. § 2003.049(g).
114. § 2003.047(a).
115. § 2003.047(m).
116. § 815.511(d) (Vernon 2004).
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four comers of the final order. 117
As to findings of fact, even though the agencies may substitute
their judgment for that of the SOAH AU, it does not give the agency
carte blanche to begin anew based on the raw record. The judiciary
has held that the resolution of conflicting evidence that relates to
findings of fact often requires making credibility determinations.
The SOAH AU is better suited to make such determinations than is
an agency board reviewing the proposal for decision of the AU who
has heard the evidence and observed the demeanor of the witnesses.
Further, the SOAH AU position has been created to make such
determinations as a "disinterested hearings officer.' ' 18 Thereby, the
agency acts arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to provide an
explanation for changes in the fact-finding, or by merely holding that
an ALT fact-finding is "an erroneous conclusion" without more, for
such analysis gives the appearance that the agency is simply arriving
at a pre-determined result.' 19 If a board merely establishes new
findings of fact to support its holding, irrespective of the facts as
determined by the AU, such an order is irrational because the basic
purpose of requiring findings of fact is to ensure that the agency
decision comes after, not before, a careful consideration of the
evidence. Thus, the order should justify in writing that the agency
conclusions follow from its serious appraisal of the facts, and not
merely the ultimate result desired by the agency in the case.120
This holding demonstrates the significant departure from the AU
being a mere fact gatherer whose preliminary decision is given no
deference. By placing the focus of the validity of the agency order,
not only on whether there is evidence in the record to support the
agency finding of fact, but by also requiring that the agency refute
the logic and justification of the AU's findings of fact in a rational
manner, this establishes that the power of the agency is not one of
mere substitution of judgment, but a heightened standard of a rational
change in facts with specific reasons that logically and cogently
reject the reasoning of the AU who was the only one able to
determine the testimonial credibility of the witnesses that appeared
117. Id.
118. Flores, 74 S.W.3d at 539.
119. Id. at 542.
120. Id.
before him/her.
Prior to the imposition of a justification for a change of finding,
the reviewing court's only power was to determine under a
substantial evidence challenge of whether some reasonable basis
existed in the record for the action taken by the agency. 12 1 Now the
"reasonable basis" must meet the additional standard of
reasonableness in light of the contrary findings of the independent
decision-maker - the SOAH AU. The agency is now confronted
with a highly refined evidentiary record due to the analysis of the
AL. It is no longer sufficient for the agency to merely point to
evidence in the raw record to justify its findings of fact.
As for the application of the law to the underlying fact findings,
this also necessitates that before the agency may change an AU
finding, it must articulate a rational connection between the policy it
relied on and the changes it made. This requires specific findings by
the agency that would support its own application of the law in light
of the basic or underlying findings set forth in the order. 122 Finally,
to reverse the AU as to a pure question of law, as to the meaning or
interpretation of the relevant law, also demands a rational or reasoned
explanation in light of the language of the statute, prior precedent of
the agency, and specific reasons by the agency as to why the AU
misinterpreted the language of the law.' 
23
This approach maximizes institutional decision-making by
allowing the agency to utilize the expertise of agency staff for the
analysis of the basic, underlying fact, and to utilize the expertise of
its general counsel for the interpretation and application of the law.
Therefore, the board members may apply their expertise and, if
necessary, substitute judgment for the AU's finding of fact and
conclusions of law as long as there is a serious appraisal of the
evidence in the record and a rational explanation for a change of the
findings. Thus, the decision of the independent AU is critical and
material to the citizen-party, for such determination cannot be set
aside by the agency absent a rational explanation in law and/or fact.
It can be argued, however, that a citizen is not truly offered a fair
121. R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Torch Operating Co., 912 S.W.2d 790, 792
(Tex. 1995).
122. Flores, 74 S.W.3d at 542-43.
123. Id. at 545-52.
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hearing if the agency can modify basic, underlying facts without
being present at the hearing, for the board will have a total lack of
knowledge of the testimonial credibility of the witnesses. As to
issues of law and applying the law to the facts, such issues may be
determined based on a written record, but the critical issues of who
did what, when, where and how should only be determined by the
trier of fact who was present at the hearing. Furthermore, if a citizen
is willing to proceed to a hearing, the most likely reason is that there
is bona fide dispute between the parties as to the underlying, basic
facts. Thus, the argument concludes that a citizen will only truly
have a "fair hearing" by the use of an independent decision-maker, if
such person has the final determination as to the basic, underlying
facts. The Texas Legislature accepted this basic argument for all
agencies subject to the APA, which constitutes the overwhelming
majority of the agencies who must refer their contested cases to
SOAH. "'
C. Approach Two: Basic Finding of Fact - The Al is the Final
Decision-Maker
Originally, the APA provided that a finding of fact or conclusion
of law could only be modified "for reasons of policy.' '1 25  The
Legislature did not define the meaning of this phrase or term. During
the period of time that this statutory provision was applicable, the
Texas Supreme Court did not address the meaning of this term. The
Austin Court of Appeals did hold generally that the word "policy," as
used in the APA, meant "a matter involving the public interest, such
a right, duty, or expectation of the community at large derived, for
example, from a statute administered by the agency, a constitutional
provision or other source of law. ' 26 Even though the use of the
undefined phrase "for reasons of policy" may appear to be
ambiguous, it will be established that it has a fairly discernable
meaning in light of the APA as a whole and in the context of the
administrative process.
Initially, it appears undisputed that in contrast to Al~s within the
124. See supra, notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
125. 1990 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 591 (Vernon).
126. McKillip, 956 S.W.2d at 800.
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resource or utility divisions, the legislature intended to modify an
agency's power to substitute judgment on all issues of fact and/or law
contained within the proposal for decision. This provision was added
simultaneously with the creation of SOAH and the legislative history
clearly indicated that the goal of the legislature was to create a
modem administrative system where a citizen of Texas -would
believe in and actually receive a fair hearing on the disputed facts in
a particular case. However, that same legislative history indicated a
strong desire on behalf of the Legislature to retain the benefits of
institutionalized decision-making whereby no one person, but a
collection of skilled persons, would be involved in the ultimate
determination of the case. 127 This amendment must also be construed
in light of the APA as a whole. Since the agency retained the
ultimate authority to issue a final contested case order, it is that order
and not the proposal for decision issued by the SOAH AU that must
withstand judicial scrutiny upon a proper challenge filed in the court
system. 128 The judiciary reviews the validity of the agency order
based on the record developed before the AU. 129 The judiciary has
the power to affirm or reverse and remand, if it determines that the
order is based on an erroneous interpretation of the law. 13 The court
will substitute judgment if it finds that the agency has misinterpreted
a relevant statutory or rule provision, but in recent years the
construction of a statute by an administrative agency charged with its
enforcement is entitled to serious consideration and deference so long
as it is reasonable and does not contravene the plain language of the
statute. 131 Therefore, viewing these amendments in light of the
administrative process as a whole, the legislature intended for the
agency board to remain the final decision-maker as to the meaning
and applicability of the law to ensure consistency in decision-making
within the regulatory scheme. This would also allow the agency to
continue to receive substantial deference by the judiciary of its
interpretation and application of the law and the agency would not be
127. See supra, notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
128. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 2001.171-2001.178 (Vernon 2004).
129. § 2001.174-2001.075.
130. § 2001.174(I)(2)(A)-(D).
131. See e.g., State v. P.U.C. of Tex., 883 S.W.2d 190, 195-96 (Tex. 1994);
Dodd v. Meno, 870 S.W.2d 4, 7 (Tex. 1994).
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required to defer to an interpretation of the SOAH AU.
The ordinary legal meaning of "policy" is defined as the general
principles by which a government is guided in its management of the
public welfare. 32 In this context, it seems undisputed that since the
defining of public policy in a regulatory context is vested in the
administrative agency and accorded substantial deference by the
courts, the agency has the power to substitute judgment for that of an
AU in defining what a particular statute or rule prohibits or allows.
It would border on the absurd to hold that the Legislature intends that
an AU, who is not an expert in a particular regulatory area, could
bind the agency and subsequently the judiciary as to the meaning of
the law. This construction is bolstered by the fact that the APA
provides that prior to the holding of the contested case proceeding,
the agency shall provide the AU with a written statement of
applicable rules or policy. 33  If the AU misinterprets these
statements or addresses a new, unanticipated legal issue, then clearly
the agency may substitute judgment for that of the AU on the basis
of "reasons of policy." The hazier meaning of "reasons of policy"
relates to the finding of underlying fact and the subsequent
application of the law to those facts resulting in findings of ultimate
fact.
Generally, the judiciary reviews findings of facts under the
substantial evidence review. 134 The Texas Supreme Court has held
that under this test, the agency action will be sustained if the
evidence is such that reasonable minds could have reached the
conclusions set forth by the agency. 135 The Austin Court of Appeals
has applied this standard to a contested case order by stating that
there is substantial evidence to support an agency order if (1) the
agency's findings of basic fact or reasonable conclusions are fairly
based on evidence adduced at the hearing, (2) the agency's findings
of ultimate fact are reasonable conclusions from the basic facts, and
(3) the agency's final decision is a reasonable conclusion from the
132. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1157 (6th ed. 1990).
133. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.058(c) (Vernon 2004).
134. § 2001.174(2)(E).
135. Tex. Health Facilities Comm'n v. Charter Med., 665 S.W.2d 446, 452-53
(Tex. App. 1984).
agency's finding of ultimate fact.' 36 Thus, since it is the agency's
final order that will be subject to such judicial scrutiny, it appears
undisputed that the agency has the express or implied power to
review an ALJ's findings of fact to at least determine that it would
survive substantial evidence review. Therefore, as an aspect of
"reasons of policy" or in addition to this provision, it would border
on the absurd that an agency would be bound by either an underlying
fact or an ultimate finding of the AL that could not survive a
substantial evidence review.
The substantial evidence review standard as applied by the
judiciary, however, is very narrow in scope. Although the evidence
supporting the finding must be more than a scintilla, the contrary
evidence may actually preponderate against the findings in the view
of the judiciary, but it will be upheld, for the true test is not whether
the agency reached the correct conclusion, but whether there is some
reasonable basis that exists to support the finding.' 37 In the context
of an agency reviewing an underlying or basic finding of an AU, this
test would apparently be modified so that the agency could set aside
any finding of the AU that lacked a minimal basis of rationality in
light of the record as a whole. This clearly includes a finding that
lacks any credible evidence to support it, i.e., no evidence. However,
if the agency merely disagrees with the AU's weighing of the
credible evidence in light of the burden of proof, i.e., there is
evidence to support either a negative or affirmative finding, the
Board could not substitute judgment for that of the AU. In this
context, the agency could reverse the AU only if it concluded the
evaluation of the weight of the evidence had no basis in rationality.
It should be cautioned, however, that this analysis applies to
findings of basic or underlying fact that are defined as findings that
do not purport to be declarations of nors or standards, but merely
establish the factual circumstances to a particular case.1 38 Thus, such
findings do not rise to a "policy" level for they do not consider
whether the action is consistent with or injurious to the public
136. Tex. Bd. of Law Exam'rs v. Stevens, 850 S.W.2d 558, 551 (Tex. App.
1992).
137. Tex. Health Facilities, 665 S.W.2d at 452-53.
138. Charter Med. - Dallas v. Tex. Health Facilities, 656 S.W.2d at 935 (Tex.
App. 1983), rev'd on other grounds 665 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. 1984).
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welfare. Austin Court of Appeals held that such factual findings do
not determine if a person or entity has conformed to a right, duty or
expectation of the community at large, but such findings merely
determine what did or did not happen or what did or did not exist in a
specific scenario."' 39 The agency's scope of review appears to be
broader or more meaningful when it comes to ultimate findings of
fact. Such findings are defined as the most general factual
determinations the agency is called upon to make when it exercises
its quasi-judicial power under a statute, for while these findings are
phrased in factual language, these broad postulates are seen as
conclusions relative to legal standards for they apply specific legal
norms or "criteria" which are applicable in all similar cases, viz., a
determination that is a mixed question of law and fact.
140
Therefore, ultimate findings involve the determination of whether
in light of the statutory or rule standards the public welfare is
enhanced or such conduct is injurious or inconsistent with the stated
legal principles. For example, in the application of a liquor license
from the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission, the relevant statute
and rules required that an applicant's place and manner of business
shall not "endanger the public safety." 141 The findings as to where
the business is located, the layout of the roadways and exits and
entrances, the volume of traffic, et cetera, are underlying findings
that are made by the AL and, in most cases, absent a lack of rational
basis are binding on the agency. The determination, however, of
whether such conditions expose the public to a dangerous condition
is subject to the substitution of judgment of the agency board for the
AL's determination. 42 Thus, the agency could substitute judgment
on ultimate findings in order to be able to implement policy of the
agency in a particular case. This would also be consistent with the
institutionalized decision-making approach where only the agency,
and not an independent AU, would have the knowledge of all
previous cases of like or substantially similar facts to render a
decision that is consistent with the overall administration of the
139. McKillip, 956 S.W.2d at 800.
140. Charter Med., 656 S.W.2d at 934.
141. Bavarian Props. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 870 S.W.2d 686,
688 (Tex. App. 1994).
142. Id. at 689.
statutory scheme.
In 1997, the legislature removed the language of "for reasons of
policy" from the APA. 143 The amendments replaced the standard
with the following:
A state agency may change a finding of fact or a conclusion of
law made by the administrative law judge, only if the agency
determines:
(1) That the administrative law judge did not properly
apply or interpret applicable law, agency rules, written
policies provided [to the ALJ by the agency] or prior
administrative decisions;
(2) That the prior administrative decision on which the
administrative law judge relied is incorrect or should
be changed, or
(3) That a technical error in a finding of fact should be
changed. 144
Consistent with the previous analysis, the new standard expressly
codifies the right of an agency board to substitute judgment for that
of the ALJ in defining what a particular statute or rule prohibits or
allows. This standard makes it clear that the legislature intends that
pure issues of law, e.g., construction of the meaning of the statute or
rule, are exclusively vested in the agency to determine its ultimate
meaning. This is consistent with the modem approach of the courts
to award substantial deference to an agency's interpretation of the
law when challenged in a court of law, for it is the agency, not the
ALT, that is charged with duty to consistently and uniformly interpret
and apply what is the public policy of the state.
141
It appears equally clear that the Legislature intended to vest the
agency with substitution of judgment power as to an AU finding that
is a determination which constitutes a mixed question of law and fact.
The new provision allows the agency to substitute judgment if the
143. 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 1167, § 1 (Vernon) (codified as amended
at TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.058 (f) (Vernon 1998)).
144. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.058(e) (Vernon 2004).
145. See P.U.C. of Tex., 883 S.W.2d at 195-96. See also Dodd, 870 S.W.2d at
7; Tarrant Co. Appraisal Dist. v. Moore, 845 S.W.3d 820, 823 (Tex. 1993).
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AU "did not properly apply . . . applicable law, [and] agency
rules.' 46  "Apply" means "to put, use, or refer, as suitable or
relative; to coordinate language with a particular subject matter; as to
apply the words of a statute to a particular state of facts.'' 147 Thus,
when the AU applies the statutory or rule based criteria to the
findings of underlying fact, then the agency may substitute judgment
if it can set forth specific reasons and a legal basis as to why it is
incorrect. The judiciary will uphold the agency's action as long as
the agency articulates a rational connection between the stated policy
and the change in findings.148
This conclusion is bolstered by the statutory provision allowing
reversal if the AU does not properly interpret or apply "prior
administrative decisions."'' 49 A prior contested case order would be
cited by an AU as precedent for a proper application of the law to a
state of facts that are identical or substantially similar to the case at
hand. 150  Allowing an agency to ensure that its prior cases are
properly interpreted is consistent with the concept that it is the
agency who is charged with administering the regulatory program
because all like cases involving similar facts in law are decided in a
manner consistent with the overall administrative scheme. This is
further bolstered by the second basis for reversal - when an agency
desires to overrule a prior decision relied upon by the AU.'151 The
legislature clearly desires to continue to vest in the agency board the
power to consistently interpret and apply the statutes and rules within
its jurisdiction.
As to AU findings of the underlying facts, the new standard
appears to be clear that the agency is no longer free to substitute
judgment when the board merely disagrees with how the AU
weighed the evidence. Since the standard restricts reversal of a
finding of fact to technical err6rs only, 152 this would clearly imply
that this is the sole basis for reversal of an underlying finding of fact.
146. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.058(e)(1) (Vernon 2004).
147. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 99 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
148. See generally Levy, 966 S.W.2d 813; McKillip, 956 S.W.2d 795.
149. TEX. GOv'T CODE ANN. § 2001.058(e)(1) (Vernon 2004).
150. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1176 (6th ed. 1990).
151. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.058(e)(2) (Vernon 2004).
152. § 2001.058(e)(3).
The key issue is the meaning of technical error. "Technical" is
ordinarily defined as "immaterial, not affecting substantial rights,
without substance." 153  "Technical error" is ordinarily defined as
"errors committed in the course of trial which would have not
prejudiced the party and hence are not grounds for reversal."' 154
Thus, the only findings of fact that can be changed are findings of
fact that would not affect the substantive rights of the parties.
The difficulty with this interpretation, viewed in isolation, is that
it fails to take into account the APA process reviewed as a whole. If
the ultimate agency order is appealed to the constitutional court
system, the findings of fact will be reviewed under a substantial
evidence standard of review.1 55  As stated above, the substantial
evidence test requires, at a minimum, that there be more than a
scintilla of evidence which an agency could have reasonably relied
upon to support a finding of basic fact. 15 6 This standard would allow
reversal if a finding of fact lacked any credible evidence to support it,
i.e., had no evidence. 157 It would be absurd to hold that the board
could not reverse an AU finding of basic fact if it lacked sufficient
evidence in the record upon which a reasonable person could so rely.
This is particularly evident since the agency would be required to
defend this defective finding in the constitutional courts.
The significant impact of the new standard is that it will be a rare
case in which a finding of an AU has no evidence to support it, and
the common issue asserted before the agency will be that the AU
incorrectly assessed the weight of the evidence. It seems undisputed
that the legislature no longer desires that the agency board have the
power to reverse such a finding merely because it disagrees with how
the AU weighed the evidence. Thus, in most contested cases, the
AU will be the sole trier of fact as to the basic underlying facts as to
the relevant and material issues involved in the dispute. The citizens
of Texas will now truly have the right to an impartial decision-maker
in determining the weight of the evidence as to the basic underlying
facts.
153. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1460 (6th ed. 1990).
154. Id.
155. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.174(2)(E) (Vernon 2004).
156. Dunn, 665 S.W.3d at 452-53.
157. Tomlinson v. Jones, 677 S.W.2d 490, 294 (Tex. 1984).
Spring 2005 The Texas State Office of Administrative Hearings
152 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 25-1
This analysis was recently confirmed in a memorandum opinion
of the Austin Court of Appeals in Texas State Board of Medical
Examiners v. Dunn.158 In Dunn, a hearing was held to determine if a
physician's license that had been suspended should be reinstated.
The critical, basic, underlying fact findings of the AL that supported
the ALJ's ultimate conclusion that the physician should be allowed to
return to practice under certain conditions were: "[1] before Dunn
began abusing drugs, he was clinically competent [and is] [2]
physically, mentally and otherwise competent to safely practice
medicine contingent on remaining in recovery." 59 These were in fact
basic findings, for no statutory or rule-based criteria were utilized by
the physician or the board to prove or disprove either issue of
competency, but the physician utilized expert testimony to prove his
competency. The board failed to present any expert testimony at
the hearing as to the competency of the physician either before his
license was suspended or at the time of his application for his
reinstatement. 61 However, the board rejected the ALl's finding set
forth above because, among other reasons, the AU findings were not
supported by substantial evidence. 162 The Dunn holding is a case of
first impression where the court was willing to review the record to
determine if substantial evidence existed as to those basic, underlying
facts of competency.'
63
Even though the court did not acknowledge what they were doing
or expressly hold that it was legitimate for the board to attempt to
reject an ALl's basic, underlying fact on the basis of a lack of
substantial evidence, they were correct in entertaining such an
argument if one views the APA as a whole. In excruciating detail,
the court sifted through the evidence to establish there was no
evidence to support the board's change of the basic competency
findings, but there was sufficient credible evidence to support the
ALl's findings, and thus, the board was powerless to modify the
158. Tex. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Dunn, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 9833
(2003).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 13-14
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 10-11.
findings of competency.' 64 This decision is significant because it
confirms that an agency may review an AU's basic, underlying
findings of fact to determine if there is substantial evidence to
support them and, if there is not, the board may substitute proper
findings. However, if the board's dispute with the ALJ's findings
merely goes to the weight of the evidence, the board is powerless to
modify the same.165
In Dunn the board also rejected the AU's finding as to ultimate
or mixed application of law to fact findings. 166 The board rejected
the AU's ultimate finding that it was in the "public interest" and the
"physician's interest" to allow reinstatement.167 This is exactly the
type of finding the meets the definition of an ultimate fact finding for
while these findings are: "phrased in factual language, these broad
postulates are seen easily as conclusions relative to legal standards
for they purport to apply in a specific case legal norms or 'criteria'
which are applicable in all similar cases."'168 These findings of
"public interest" will be the key, critical mixed application of law to
fact findings that will determine whether a physician is entitled to
reinstatement in all like-kind cases.
Even though the agency has the power to modify such ultimate
findings, the APA requires that the agency shall state in writing the
specific reasons and legal basis for the change made.' 69 The Austin
Court of Appeals has previously held, as set forth above, that "legal
basis" is the source from which the policy is derived and the term
"reason" requires the agency to articulate a rational connection
between the stated policy and the change ordered by the agency.
70
In Dunn, the court held that a justification is not sufficient or rational
if the agency merely concluded that the AL's findings lacked
substantial evidence when the record established to the contrary. In
addition, the justification for a change of findings was not rational
when the board held the AL should have considered the applicant's
164. Id. at 17-22.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 30.
167. Id.
168. Charter Med., 656 S.W.2d at 934.
169. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.058(e)(3) (Vernon 2004).
170. See, e.g., Flores, 74 S.W.3d at 539-45; Levy, 966 S.W.2d at 815-16;
McKillip, 956 S.W.2d at 800-01.
Spring 2005 The Texas State Office of Administrative Hearings
154 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 25-1
failure to prove fulfilling certain conditions that were impossible to
meet under the restrictions of his probation period.'
7
'
In a second decision, 172 the Texas Department of Insurance did
successfully defend its modification of an AL's ultimate finding of
fact. The finding was the ultimate finding of whether the applicant
was "fit for licensure" which required the fact finder to apply certain
statutory criteria. 173 The Commission modified the AU's ultimate
finding of fitness on the basis that the AU failed to properly apply
and interpret certain rules related to the particular underlying or basic
findings that were not in dispute. 174 The court held the Commission
had the power to modify the finding because it involved the
interpretation and application of agency rules and the commission
had rationally set forth the source of the policy and demonstrated a
rational basis for the change in light of the proper legal interpretation
being applied to the basic or underlying facts. 1
These two decisions send a clear message to agencies that if the
basic, underlying facts are critical to the determination of the
contested case proceeding, the agency must establish its position of
those fact issues by the counsel for the agency presenting to the
SOAH AU sworn testimony of witnesses and other admissible
evidence at the time of the contested case hearing. The board may
not simply sit back and choose to reevaluate the evidence upon
review of the proposal for decision. If the AU's basic, underlying
facts are supported by substantial evidence, the agency simply may
not re-weigh and re-analyze the evidence and substitute its judgment
for that of the AU. The board will be bound by the basic, underlying
findings. Finally, the agency may in fact modify ultimate findings
that involve the application of legal standards to the basic underlying
facts, but it must set forth a legal and rational basis to do so. In
addition, such rationale will not be held to be a substitute for actual
evidence in the record. The rationale must justify the change in
ultimate findings based upon the basic, underlying facts of the SOAH
AU, unless such findings are not supported by substantial evidence.
171. Tex. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 9833.
172. Smith v. Montemayor, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 5099 (2003).
173. Id. at 5101-02.
174. Id. at 5102.
175. Id.
Therefore, the APA mandated deference to the SOAH AL's PFD
strikes a balance between the need for an "institutional decision" and
the need for an impartial decision-maker as to the underlying facts.
This accommodation appears to best fulfill the overall purpose of
agencies which is to gain the necessary expertise in the regulatory
area and to apply that expertise in a consistent and uniform manner.
However, it allows the citizens of the state of Texas to believe that
they received a fair trial as to the factual disputes within the contested
case proceeding.
V. CONCLUSION
Texas administrative law has always been predicated on the
fundamental notion that a regulatory agency was created to be or to
become an expert body in a particular field, to which they will then
apply such expertise in a uniform and consistent manner. It has also
been perceived that this goal must be achieved by "in house"
adjudicators who merely aid the agency board in rendering a
contested case order. However, modem perceptions mandate that
such contested case proceedings have the rudiments of fair play
which necessitates an impartial decision-maker. Such a goal could
seriously undermine the ability of an agency to engage in
"institutional decision-making" whereby it may call on the expertise
of its employees to reach an informed, consistent result in all
contested case proceedings. The modem Texas model has
demonstrated that independent decision-makers can in fact be utilized
without threatening or abolishing the institutional decision-making
approach.
The critical or fundamental change was to require that the agency
not solely focus on the hearing record when rendering a final
decision, but to force the agency to focus on that record and the
analysis of that record as set forth by the ALJ within his or her
proposal for decision. By changing the focus and requiring that an
agency justify in writing within the final order the reason and legal
basis for each and every change made to the SOAH AU's proposal
for decision, the initial decision of the ALJ, who literally has no
responsibility to, nor is directly accountable to, the agency board,
becomes the presumptive basis for the final decision absent a rational
explanation to the contrary. Therefore, even if the agency board may
substitute judgment on all findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
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citizen-party is ensured a rational, objective decision based on a
known record.
The second fundamental aspect of the Texas system is to take this
"AU deference standard" one more step by providing that an AU's
findings as to basic, underlying fact are binding upon the agency as
long as there is reasonable evidentiary support within the record. For
those who believe the "rudiments of fair play" are not present unless
an independent decision-maker has the power to ultimately decide
who did or did not do what, when, where and how, this second
approach clearly fulfills this requirement. It has been established that
even with this fundamental change, the agency is quite free to apply
its expertise and utilize the expertise of its employees, while
ultimately being able to ensure consistent, rational application of
legislative policy. Thereby, the need for a central hearings panel
which is vested with ultimate decision-making authority on all issues
of law and fact is not necessary to ensure a fair hearing and a fair
result in agency contested case proceedings.
